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  INTRODUCTION   
Two hallmarks of the Bush administration have been its 
reliance on constitutional theories of strong presidential power 
and its penchant for secrecy. The connection between the two is 
clear in the case of executive privilege, which justifies presiden-
tial secrecy by invoking the President’s constitutional powers.1 
In the case of another influential theory—that of the “unitary 
executive,” the connection is less obvious. Yet there is a pro-
found bond between unitary executive theory and executive-
branch secrecy. Unitary executive theorists argue that “all fed-
eral officers exercising executive power must be subject to the 
direct control of the President.”2 Presidential control of all who 
hold executive power entails control not only over final deci-
sions, but over the mustering of “facts” used to justify the 
same.3 Moreover, formal presidential control of decision making 
necessarily devolves into de facto control by any number of 
White House offices and persons.4 The result is obfuscated re-
 
†  Associate Professor, University of Minnesota Law School. I am grate-
ful to the editors of the Minnesota Law Review for a great Symposium and 
skillful editing work. I also thank Steve Calabresi for generously and good-
naturedly exchanging ideas with me about the unitary executive and David 
Dana for helpful discussions. Copyright © 2009 by Heidi Kitrosser. 
 1. “[E]xecutive privilege claims are based on the notion that some infor-
mation requests effectively infringe on the President’s Article II powers, 
threatening his ability to receive candid advice or to protect national security.” 
Heidi Kitrosser, Secrecy and Separated Powers: Executive Privilege Revisited, 
92 IOWA L. REV. 489, 492 (2007). 
 2. Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: 
Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153, 1158 (1992). 
 3. See, e.g., Felicity Barringer, White House Refused to Open Pollutants 
E-mail, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2008, at A15; Juliet Eilperin, White House Tried 
to Silence EPA Proposal on Car Emissions, WASH. POST, June 26, 2008, at A2; 
Ron Suskind, Without a Doubt, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2004, (Magazine), at 51.  
 4. See Lisa Schultz Bressman & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Inside the 
Administrative State: A Critical Look at the Practice of Presidential Control, 
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sponsibility—whether due to a presidential design to avoid re-
sponsibility, the reality of divided power, or both. Furthermore, 
the presidency and surrounding White House offices are struc-
turally well-equipped for secrecy and information control and 
have strong political incentives to use these capacities.5 The 
practice of unitary executive theory thus lends itself to relative 
opacity and information manipulation within the vast re-
sources of the administrative state. 
The impact of unitary executive theory on presidential in-
formation control is important in its own right, but it also sheds 
light on the constitutional validity—or more precisely, invalidi-
ty—of the theory. A crucial aspect of the theory’s justification is 
that it supports political accountability.6 Unitary executive 
theorists argue that it is most consistent with political accoun-
tability for the President—rather than unelected administra-
tors—to have the final say on discretionary executive branch 
decisions.7 Voters can react to the President’s decisions at the 
ballot box, something that they cannot do with respect to bu-
reaucrats’ actions.8 Others have identified important problems 
with the accountability justification for unitary executive 
theory. Yet little sustained attention has been paid to the 
theory’s connection to increased presidential control over in-
formation flow.9 From this connection it follows not only that a 
 
105 MICH. L. REV. 47, 49–50 (2006) (“Presidential control is a ‘they,’ not an 
‘it.’”). 
 5. See Kitrosser, supra note 1, at 491–92. 
 6. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Uni-
tary Executive, 48 ARK. L. REV. 23, 35–37, 45, 59, 65–66 (1995); Lawrence Les-
sig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1, 97–99 (1994); Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Note, Hail to the Chief 
Administrator: The Framers and the President’s Administrative Powers, 102 
YALE L.J. 991, 998–99, 1012–15 (1993). 
 7. See sources cited supra note 6.  
 8. See sources cited supra note 6. 
 9. I do not mean to suggest that others have failed to note the phenome-
non of secret White House involvement in administrative affairs. A number of 
commentators, particularly in the administrative law literature, have dis-
cussed secrecy in White House oversight of rule makings. See, e.g., Nicholas 
Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory State, 
106 COLUM. L. REV. 1260, 1266–67, 1281–82, 1309–10 (2006); Steven Croley, 
White House Review of Agency Rulemaking: An Empirical Investigation, 70 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 821, 878, 882, 884–85 (2003); Christoper C. DeMuth & Douglas 
H. Ginsburg, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking, 99 HARV. L. REV. 
1075, 1085–86 (1986); Alan B. Morrison, OMB Interference with Agency Rule-
making: The Wrong Way to Write a Regulation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1059, 1064–
65, 1067–69 (1986); Erik D. Olson, The Quiet Shift of Power: Office of Man-
agement & Budget Supervision of Environmental Protection Agency Rulemak-
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unitary executive does not enhance accountability, but that it 
undermines accountability. It does so, first, by increasing the 
President’s ability to shield or manipulate the very information 
on which the public might judge his actions. Second, it replaces 
multiple identifiable avenues for public input and information 
access with a single, intrinsically opaque and relatively inac-
cessible formal decision maker. Third, the formal decision mak-
er retains substantial ability to distance himself from unpopu-
lar decisions by pointing to actual or purported actions by 
inferiors within an opaque executive branch. 
A unitary executive theorist (or “unitarian”)10 would re-
spond that the functional accountability argument is accompa-
nied by formalist arguments from text, structure, and history 
that themselves are sufficient to demand a unitary executive.11 
I address these arguments in my Article Accountability and 
Administrative Structure, which is part of a larger project on 
presidential power and information control.12 The instant Ar-
ticle focuses on the functional side of things, emphasizing the 
practical impact of unity on information control and accounta-
bility.  
It also is important to understand that one need not agree 
that unity plainly undermines accountability to share this Ar-
ticle’s conclusion that the accountability argument for unity is 
flawed. Rather, the point need only be reasonably arguable to 
support this Article’s conclusion. So long as it is reasonably ar-
guable that unity undermines, rather than bolsters, accounta-
 
ing Under Executive Order 12,291, 4 VA. J. NAT. RESOURCES L. 1, 4–5, 14, 55–
64 (1984); Peter L. Strauss & Cass R. Sunstein, The Role of the President and 
OMB in Informal Rulemaking, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 181, 188–89 (1986). My 
point is that sustained analyses of the connection between secrecy, accounta-
bility, and unitary executive theory have been relatively rare. They are not, 
however, unprecedented. For examples of such analysis, see Peter M. Shane, 
Presidents, Pardons, and Prosecutors: Legal Accountability and the Separation 
of Powers, 11 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 361, 400–01 (1993), and Michele Estrin 
Gilman, The President as Scientist-in-Chief, 45 WILLAMETTE L. REV. (forth-
coming Apr. 2009). 
 10. I use the term “unitarian”—despite its usual religious implications—
as shorthand, given the unwieldy nature of the phrase “unitary executive 
theorist.” Others have used the term to describe unitary executive theorists as 
well, presumably for the same reason. See, e.g., Martin S. Flaherty, The Most 
Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725, 1740–44 (1996).  
 11. See M. Elizabeth Magill, The Real Separation in Separation of Powers 
Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1127, 1138 (2000). 
 12. Heidi Kitrosser, Accountability & Administrative Structure, 45 WIL-
LAMETTE L. REV. (forthcoming Apr. 2009). 
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bility, then unity fails to so plainly further accountability as to 
support an unyielding, categorical unity directive.  
The Bush administration offers a powerful case study in 
the impact of unitary executive theory on information control 
and in the negative relationship between a unitary executive 
and accountability. It also demonstrates independent risks that 
stem from the fact that the theory is poorly understood by the 
public and politicians, and that the parameters of the theory’s 
practical applications are not fully evident even in scholarly 
work on the topic. Thus, three major lessons can be gleaned 
from Bush administration action and argument relating to uni-
tary executive theory. First, insofar as some administration ac-
tions clearly manifest unitary executive theory—that is, insofar 
as they substitute White House control for discretionary deci-
sion making statutorily or traditionally reserved for adminis-
trative professionals—they demonstrate the negative correla-
tion between the unitary executive and accountability. Second, 
some assertions of White House control negatively impact in-
formation flow and accountability, but do so in a context where 
it is not fully clear whether or to what extent unitary executive 
theory demands such control. Such instances both demonstrate 
the negative link between unitary executive theory and accoun-
tability—at least by comparison and extrapolation—as well as 
the lack of clarity as to the theory’s practical implications. 
Third, some assertions of White House control clearly stretch 
unitary executive theory beyond its bounds, thus compounding 
any harm to information flow and accountability caused by 
“correct” interpretations of the theory. 
The first lesson is exemplified by the pressure placed on 
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) by the Bush White 
House to suppress a planned rule making. The rule making re-
portedly contained scientific analysis explaining that green-
house gases are pollutants that can and should be regulated.13 
Presidential control over rule makings—whether direct or 
through influence over a political appointee who the President 
can fire at will—is well within the bounds of unitary executive 
theory.14 Yet the secrecy surrounding the EPA decision and its 
suppressive effect on information exemplifies the risks to ac-
countability intrinsic in such control. The second lesson is ex-
emplified by White House efforts to block and manipulate re-
 
 13. See infra Part III.A. 
 14. See Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 2, at 1166. 
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search and analysis on climate change in federal agencies.15 
There is little question that, under unitary executive theory, 
the President has full power to dismiss personnel who make 
discretionary decisions, even if their job also entails research 
and analysis.16 It also is clear under the theory that those who 
exercise discretionary decision making and who oversee re-
searchers and analysts are under full presidential control, as 
are inspectors general or others who might be empowered to 
investigate claims of improper interference with research.17 In 
all of these respects, then, this example reflects the heightened 
presidential control over research and analysis that unitary ex-
ecutive theory requires. On the other hand, it is not clear that 
the theory demands direct presidential control over those 
whose jobs entail only research and analysis. The example thus 
simultaneously demonstrates the negative impact of unitary 
executive theory on information flow and accountability, and 
the need to clarify the theory’s parameters. The third lesson is 
exemplified by the Bush administration’s conflating of unitary 
executive theory with a more general expansion of presidential 
power.18 This too, demonstrates the need to clarify the theory’s 
practical boundaries and the harms of not so doing.  
Part I of this Article summarizes unitary executive theory, 
its major functionalist justification from accountability and 
criticisms that others have made of that justification. Part II 
introduces the negative correlation between a unitary executive 
and free information flow, and thus between a unitary execu-
tive and accountability. Part III elaborates on the examples de-
scribed above, explaining that they exemplify both the negative 
correlation between unitary executive theory and accountabili-
ty, as well as the importance of clarifying the theory’s bounda-
ries. The Article’s conclusion summarizes why the accountabili-
ty-based justifications for unitary executive theory are 
unsound. It also seeks to offer some common ground for suppor-
ters and opponents of the theory. At minimum, these two 
groups should be able to agree on the importance of clarifying 
the theory’s parameters. To the extent that unitary executive 
theory remains influential, such clarification might deter 
abuses of the theory and thus positively impact information 
flow and accountability.  
 
 15. See infra Part III.B. 
 16. See Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 2, at 1166.  
 17. See id. at 1165–66. 
 18. See infra Conclusion. 
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I.  UNITARY EXECUTIVE THEORY: MAJOR ARGUMENTS 
AND MAJOR CRITICISMS   
A.  THE THEORY AND ITS MAJOR JUSTIFICATIONS 
As Steven Calabresi and Kevin Rhodes explained in a 1992 
article, “[u]nitary executive theorists claim that all federal of-
ficers exercising executive power must be subject to the direct 
control of the President.”19 The strongest version of the theory 
would accord the President “direct power to supplant any dis-
cretionary executive action taken by a subordinate with which 
he disagrees, notwithstanding any statute that attempts to vest 
discretionary executive power only in the subordinate.”20 Under 
this approach, for example, the President may at any time 
substitute his judgment for that of the Federal Aviation Admin-
istration (FAA) when the latter acts pursuant to its statutory 
charge to promulgate regulations and minimum safety stan-
dards.21 A milder version of the theory “recognizes that, al-
though the President lacks the authority to act in the place of 
his subordinates, he has the power to nullify or veto their exer-
cises of discretionary executive power.”22 Under this version, 
the President may not supplant FAA safety standards with his 
own standards. He may, however, nullify any FAA standards 
with which he disagrees. “The third and weakest model of the 
unitary executive contends that the President has unlimited 
power to remove at will any principal officers (and perhaps cer-
tain inferior officers) who exercise executive power.”23 Under 
this approach, the President may not himself perform the du-
ties statutorily charged to the FAA. He may, however, fire any 
FAA administrator who does not perform as the President 
wishes.  
Unitarians argue that the Constitution demands unity 
both as a formal matter24 of text and history and as a function-
 
 19. Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 2, at 1158. 
 20. Id. at 1166. 
 21. 49 U.S.C. § 44701(a) (2006).  
 22. Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 2, at 1166. 
 23. Id. 
 24. For better or worse, separation-of-powers arguments fall into two 
main categories: formalist and functionalist. See Magill, supra note 11, at 
1138. Formalists tend to focus on whether a given activity is legislative, execu-
tive, or judicial, and to suggest that relatively clear and unalterable constitu-
tional rules apply to each (e.g., if an activity is executive in nature, the Presi-
dent must control it; if an activity is legislative in nature, it must go through 
the legislative procedures outlined in Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution). 
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al matter of effectuating constitutional principles. This Article 
focuses on unitarians’ second, functional set of arguments.  
Functionally, unitarians emphasize accountability as an 
important constitutional principle,25 noting that it was one of 
the reasons why the Founders created a single President as op-
posed to a plural executive.26 They deem it clear that a unitary 
executive furthers accountability. Indeed, as Martin Flaherty 
notes, accountability tends to be treated as a “trump card” by 
“proponents, and even many opponents, of the unitary execu-
tive.”27 The gist of the accountability argument is that the Pres-
ident is the only nationally elected figure in American politics. 
If he controls all law execution in the United States, then the 
national electorate has a clear object of blame or reward for 
such activity.28 In contrast, giving the final word in law execu-
tion to unelected bureaucrats leaves no avenue for political ac-
countability.29 Even if power were deemed to rest not in un-
elected bureaucrats but in congresspersons—say, through their 
setting of the terms of bureaucratic employment or worse, 
through the influence of select congressional committee mem-
 
See id. at 1138–40. Functionalists tend to be less convinced that all govern-
ment actions can be neatly divided into three categories or that the Constitu-
tion outlines categorical rules as to how such actions must proceed. See id. at 
1142–44. In situations where they see no clear rules, they tend to emphasize 
constitutional principles—arguing that the relevant constitutional question is 
whether a particular action functionally impedes applicable constitutional 
principles. See id. Of course, commentators can and often do address both 
types of arguments (e.g., formalism demands a unitary executive, but even if 
formalism does not so demand, functional principles lead to the same conclu-
sion). For a similar summary of formalism and functionalism, see for example, 
Magill, supra note 11, at 1138–44. 
 25. See Flaherty, supra note 10, at 1740 (explaining that while unitarians 
cite other principles as well, “[m]ost often these goals collapse into what is eas-
ily the dominant constitutional value that [unitarians] identify—the require-
ment that government remain accountable to the people”).  
 26. See, e.g., Calabresi, supra note 6, at 42–45 (explaining that Alexander 
Hamilton considered a unitary executive a necessity for ensuring accountabili-
ty); Prakash, supra note 6, at 998–99 (noting that among the reasons the Fra-
mers rejected a plural executive was their belief that a “single, responsible ex-
ecutive could be accountable for his personal selections and administrative 
decisions”). 
 27. See Flaherty, supra note 10, at 1824.  
 28. See, e.g., Calabresi, supra note 6, at 35–37, 59, 65–66 (arguing that 
the essential ingredient in combating the congressional collective action prob-
lem is the President’s national voice); see also Morton Rosenberg, Congress’s 
Prerogative over Agencies and Agency Decisionmakers: The Rise and Demise of 
the Reagan Administration’s Theory of the Unitary Executive, 57 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 627, 690–91 (1989) (describing and criticizing this argument). 
 29. See, e.g., Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 6, at 97–99. 
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bers30—the undivided, national accountability of a President 
would be lacking.31 Even if power simply were deemed di-
vided—for example, between Congress, the President, un-
elected bureaucrats, and the private interests that impact law 
execution—accountability again would suffer through the ab-
sence of a single, nationally responsive figure to blame or to 
reward.32  
B.  MAJOR CRITICISMS OF THE FUNCTIONALISTIC ARGUMENT 
FROM ACCOUNTABILITY 
Some prominent critics of unitary executive theory concede 
unitarians’ point on accountability, even as they criticize other 
aspects of the theory.33 Yet not all take it as a given that the 
unitary executive enhances accountability. Criticisms of the ac-
countability argument tend to contain two parts. First, critics 
seek to clarify what accountability means as a matter of consti-
tutional principle. Second, they argue that accountability, 
properly defined, is not furthered by a unitary executive.  
Martin Flaherty argues that the Constitution adopts a 
framework of joint, rather than single or simple accountabili-
 
 30. In their paper for this panel, Steven Calabresi and Nicholas Terrell 
express concern about the secrecy of communications in the oversight process 
between congressional committees and the federal bureaucracy. Steven G. Ca-
labresi & Nicholas Terrell, The Fatally Flawed Theory of the Unbundled Ex-
ecutive, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1696,1704 n.45 (2009). Congress has similar legisla-
tive flexibility to address oversight abuses and secrecy by congressional 
committees as it does to address those in the executive branch. This example 
bolsters the point that undue political control of the bureaucracy, and secrecy 
in the same, is a complex and multifaceted problem that is best addressed 
through legislative flexibility rather than by constitutionalizing the blunt and 
problematic instrument of the unitary executive. 
 31. See, e.g., Calabresi, supra note 6, at 65 (“The minute some portion of 
the executive is cut free from the President and the national electoral consti-
tuency which he and he alone represents, it tends to become swallowed up by 
the state and local pressures that drive the congressional committees and sub-
committees.”). 
 32. See id. at 58–70; Prakash, supra note 6, at 993, 1012–15 (discussing 
the Framers’ rejection of a plural executive because of its tendency to destroy 
responsibility and conceal faults). 
 33. See, e.g., Abner S. Greene, Checks and Balances in an Era of Presiden-
tial Lawmaking, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 123, 177 (1994) (acknowledging that it is 
difficult for citizens to know whom to blame when something goes wrong in a 
system of divided powers and complex checks and balances); cf. Lessig & 
Sunstein, supra note 6, at 2–4, 85–86, 94, 98–99 (rejecting formalist argu-
ments for unity but embracing the accountability argument and thus largely 
supporting unity). 
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ty.34 By giving executive, legislature, and judiciary alike a link 
to popular accountability, the Constitution is designed to keep 
a single branch from “rush[ing] through ill-considered [meas-
ures] on the strength of a self-serving and distorted reliance on 
popular will.”35 Others similarly criticize the simplistic vision of 
accountability on which unitary executive theory relies.36  
Peter Shane also cites problems with simple accountabili-
ty.37 First, Shane notes that the Founders, not anticipating the 
administrative state and the rise of executive policymaking, did 
not envision presidential accountability “for the policy content 
of administrative decisions.”38 Rather, the Founders saw presi-
dential accountability as “managerial accountability”; the focus 
was on competence and integrity, not policy, as the criterion for 
judging administration.39 Second, if constitutional principles do 
mandate political accountability for policymaking in the mod-
ern administrative state, this goal may not be furthered by cen-
tralizing all discretionary decision making in the President.40 If 
political accountability means accountability to the national 
majority, then presidential elections are too blunt an instru-
ment to achieve it.41 The President faces the national electorate 
at most twice, and because each voter casts but a single vote for 
President based on any one of thousands of issues and con-
cerns, presidential elections cannot foster meaningful accoun-
tability for policymaking.42 If political accountability means ac-
countability to some objective conception of the public interest, 
 
 34. See Flaherty, supra note 10, at 1785. For a general discussion of sim-
ple versus joint accountability, see id. at 1767–68, 1785–86, 1804–05, 1821–
22, 1824–25. 
 35. See id. at 1785 (explaining that colonial legislatures had acted in such 
a fashion under systems of simple accountability). 
 36. See, e.g., Cynthia R. Farina, The Consent of the Governed: Against 
Simple Rules for a Complex World, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 987, 992–1007, 
1017–20 (1997) (arguing that the characteristics of American democratic go-
vernance make a unitary executive unsuitable); Jerry L. Mashaw, Structuring 
a “Dense Complexity”: Accountability and the Project of Administrative Law, 
ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP, Mar. 2005, art. 4, at 12–15, 35–38 (2005), 
http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss6/art4. 
 37. Peter M. Shane, Independent Policymaking and Presidential Power: A 
Constitutional Analysis, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 596, 613–14 (1989). 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Peter M. Shane, Political Accountability in a System of Checks and 
Balances: The Case of Presidential Review of Rulemaking, 48 ARK. L. REV. 161, 
197–202 (1995). 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 199–200.  
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or to those parties most directly affected by decisions, there si-
milarly is little reason to deem the blunt instrument of presi-
dential elections well equipped to achieve that goal.43 Hierar-
chical presidential control also does not necessarily foster key 
elements of accountability—including dialogue and transparen-
cy—and may deter them through politically motivated secrecy 
and intimidation.44 
Rebecca Brown challenges the notion that electoral accoun-
tability for policy choices is a core constitutional value, citing 
the many ways in which the Constitution reflects a fear of ex-
cessive popular control and embraces an indirect relationship 
between the people, their representatives, and policymaking.45 
The accountability envisioned by the Constitution, says Brown, 
is not simple accountability defined by responsiveness to major-
ity wants, but oversight accountability designed to protect 
against government abuse and corruption.46 
Edward Rubin too believes that unitarians err by conflat-
ing accountability with simple accountability or responsiveness 
to majority preferences.47 Rubin notes that, “[a]s used in ordi-
nary language, accountability refers to the ability of one actor 
to demand an explanation or justification of another actor for 
its actions and to reward or punish that second actor on the ba-
sis of its performance or its explanation.”48 Such accountability 
is best furthered not by occasional, winner-take-all elections, 
but by the complex chains of authority and expertise that cha-
racterize bureaucracies.49 
 
 43. See id. at 203–06 (arguing that a President’s “abandonment of particu-
lar interests in a particular episode is not likely to be so important to his ree-
lection prospects—if he has any—to deter a President determined to go his 
own way”). 
 44. Id. at 204–09; see also Shane, supra note 9, at 400 (“There is an ob-
vious tension between theoretical support for plenary presidential authority 
regarding foreign affairs on the grounds of accountability and the efforts of 
Presidents who largely possess such authority to shield their exercise of power 
from public exposure.”).  
 45. Rebecca L. Brown, Accountability, Liberty, and the Constitution, 98 
COLUM. L. REV. 531, 552–59, 564–65 (1998). 
 46. Id. at 564–65. 
 47. Edward Rubin, The Myth of Accountability and the Anti-
Administrative Impulse, 103 MICH. L. REV. 2073, 2076–83 (2005). 
 48. Id. at 2119. 
 49. See id. at 2078–80, 2121–22, 2134–35. Rubin further argues that elec-
tions themselves are predominantly geared not toward accountability, but to-
ward succession and representativeness. Id. at 2078, 2134–35. 
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II.  ACCOUNTABILITY AND TRANSPARENCY   
Existing challenges to the unitarian view of accountability 
share an important common observation: the simple accounta-
bility assumed by unitarians does not comport with the Consti-
tution’s complex approach to accountability. This section builds 
on this observation, demonstrating that transparency and me-
chanisms to respond to transparent information are crucial 
elements of constitutional accountability. 
As an initial matter, the Constitution reflects not one, but 
several, visions of accountability. The vision or visions that ap-
ply in a given case vary depending on some combination of the 
function and actor involved. For instance, it is fairly intuitive 
that the type of accountability called for in the context of ad-
ministrative adjudication is different than that called for in 
other administrative contexts. While administrative accounta-
bility often demands some degree of political responsiveness, 
administrative adjudicators are accountable for adhering to the 
rule of law and thus require relative independence from poli-
tics.50  
The remainder of this section describes three major types 
of accountability relevant to the unitary executive debate.  
A.  COMPETENCE/ANTICORRUPTION-BASED ACCOUNTABILITY 
(A.K.A ORIGINAL ANTICIPATED PRESIDENTIAL ACCOUNTABILITY) 
Unitarians draw heavily on founding references to the vir-
tues of a single president. Chief among these virtues is presi-
dential accountability. However, as Peter Shane points out, the 
Founders operated under expectations of a small federal gov-
ernment, a limited set of federal legislative directives, and a 
President who typically would need only to “keep within lawful 
bounds, spend public funds carefully, and deal with problems 
evenhandedly.”51 This type of presidential accountability was 
not accountability about policymaking, but accountability about 
presidential competence, fairness, and lawfulness.52 
 
 50. See, e.g., Cynthia R. Farina, Undoing the New Deal Through the New 
Presidentialism, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 227, 233–34 (1998) (arguing that 
presidential control is uniquely problematic in the context of administrative 
adjudications and “even the most ardent presidentialists have been careful to 
insist that the Chief Executive could not intervene to direct the outcome of 
particular cases”).  
 51. Shane, supra note 37, at 613. 
 52. Id. at 613–14.  
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The founding conception of presidential accountability as-
sumes and depends on the existence of multiple checking 
forces—including the people, the courts, and Congress—and 
mechanisms for those forces to expose and respond to presiden-
tial corruption or incompetence.53 As I have explained else-
where, constitutional text, structure, and history reflect a bril-
liant balance between secrecy’s advantages—embodied in the 
President’s capacity to keep secrets—and its dangers—
embodied in Congress’s prerogatives to limit presidential secre-
cy and to provide for the revelation of secrets through legisla-
tion and oversight.54  
This balance is reflected in Alexander Hamilton’s famous 
declaration as Publius about the advantages of a single Presi-
dent.55 In one Federalist paper, Hamilton boasted both of the 
unitary President’s capacity for “secrecy”56 and his relative 
transparency and responsibility. Regarding the latter, Hamil-
ton explained that “multiplication of the executive adds to the 
difficulty of detection,”57 whereas one person “will be more nar-
rowly watched and most readily suspected.”58 Hamilton elabo-
rated that: 
[T]he plurality of the executive tends to deprive the people of the two 
greatest securities they can have for the faithful exercise of any dele-
gated power, first, the restraints of public opinion . . . ; and, second, 
the opportunity of discovering with facility and clearness the miscon-
duct of the persons they trust, in order either to their removal from 
office or to their actual punishment in cases which admit of it.59 
Similar points were made throughout the ratification de-
bates. In the Pennsylvania debates, for example, one constitu-
tional proponent remarked that the Constitution’s single Presi-
dent will be “better to be trusted” because he “has no 
screen . . . . [N]ot a single privilege is annexed to his character; 
far from being above the laws, he is amenable to them in his 
private character as a citizen, and in his public character by 
 
 53. See id.  
 54. Heidi Kitrosser, Classified Information Leaks and Free Speech, 2008 
U. ILL. L. REV. 881, 917–18. 
 55. THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 428–29 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton 
Rossiter ed., 1961). 
 56. Id. at 392, 395–98. 
 57. Id. at 395–96. 
 58. Id. at 398. 
 59. Id. at 428–29. 
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impeachment.”60 Similarly, James Monroe asserted in Virginia 
that “[t]here should be no constitutional restraint, no equivoca-
tion of office, to shield a traitor from the justice of an injured 
people. No circumstance to blunt or turn aside the keen edge of 
their resentment. . . . For these reasons the executive power 
should be vested altogether in one person . . . .”61 The Virginia 
Independent Chronicle also boasted of the Constitution that:  
The president stands alone. The United States are the scrutinising 
spectators of his conduct, and he will, always, be the distinguished ob-
ject of political jealousy. Destitute of a council and of the means, by 
which he might extend his influence and secure his safety, he and he 
alone is responsible for any perversion of power.62 
B.  POLICY-BASED ACCOUNTABILITY (A.K.A ORIGINAL 
ANTICIPATED LEGISLATIVE ACCOUNTABILITY) 
The Framers of the Constitution embraced a distinct type 
of accountability with respect to policymaking: indirect, atte-
nuated review by the people.63 The Framers  
[a]t every turn . . . buffered majority will, insulated representatives 
from direct influence of majority factions, and provided checks on ma-
jority decisionmaking. The framers of the Constitution were afraid of 
government, even if made up of officials elected by the people. Madi-
son’s renowned invective against faction, defined to include a numeri-
cal majority of the people, suggests a real difference between the goal 
of representative government, on the one hand, and the translation of 
popular will into law, on the other.64 
While the people would have final say, through elections, 
over the various players in the legislative process,65 such ac-
countability would be of a gestalt nature. This was a far cry 
from a popular right to demand particular policy outcomes on 
particular issues. 
 
 60. 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTI-
TUTION, RATIFICATION BY THE STATES, PENNSYLVANIA 495 (Merrill Jensen ed., 
1976) (emphasis omitted). 
 61. 9 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTI-
TUTION, RATIFICATION BY THE STATES, VIRGINIA 865 (John P. Kaminski & 
Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1990). 
 62. 8 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTI-
TUTION, RATIFICATION BY THE STATES, VIRGINIA 245 (John P. Kaminski & 
Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1988) (emphasis omitted). 
 63. See Brown, supra note 45, at 553–54. 
 64. Id. at 553.  
 65. The elections I refer to are the indirect election of President through 
the electoral college, U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 3; the direct election of Repre-
sentatives, id. art. I, § 2, cl. 1; the indirect election of Senators through elected 
state legislatures, id. art. I, § 3, cl. 1; and, since the passage of the Seven-
teenth Amendment, the direct election of Senators, id. amend. XVII. 
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As with the competence/anticorruption-based accountabili-
ty anticipated for the President, policy-based accountability 
demands and assumes a fair amount of transparency. If the 
people are to make electoral choices based on an overall sense 
of particular politicians—how those politicians vote and con-
duct themselves in the legislative process—then the people 
need access to information about voting, the legislative and 
oversight processes, and some factual context to make sense of 
the issues on which votes are cast. Transparency and delibera-
tion are hallmarks of the legislative process that the Constitu-
tion outlines (if not always of the process in practice).66  
C.  NECESSARY-AND-PROPER ACCOUNTABILITY  
(A.K.A. ADMINISTRATIVE STATE ACCOUNTABILITY) 
In addition to its more precisely enumerated powers, Con-
gress may make laws “necessary and proper” for effectuating 
those powers and the constitutional powers of the federal gov-
ernment generally.67 With respect to unitary executive theory, 
this raises at least two questions. First, is a nonunitary admin-
istrative state formally unconstitutional and hence an improper 
means to effectuate laws? Second, if the administrative state is 
not formally unconstitutional, what if any demands do consti-
tutional values functionally impose on it? I address the first, 
formalist question in Accountability and Administrative Struc-
ture;68 the second, functional question is this Article’s core in-
quiry.  
The major functional question regarding the administra-
tive state is whether it permits end-runs around the accounta-
bility protections that would apply were Congress or the other 
named branches performing the activities delegated to it.69 The 
Constitution’s accountability directive for the administrative 
state can be broken into two parts. First, the administrative 
state must not frustrate the accountability that the Constitu-
tion demands of the national legislature and the national ex-
ecutive.70 Second, the administrative state itself must be ac-
 
 66. Elsewhere, I have discussed the relative transparency and delibera-
tiveness of the legislative process as a matter of constitutional text, structure, 
and history. See, e.g., Kitrosser, supra note 1, at 518–20. 
 67. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
 68. See Kitrosser, supra note 12, Part II. 
 69. See Flaherty, supra note 10, at 1740 (noting that other values aside 
from accountability are relevant but that accountability is the major value 
touted by unitarians and at issue in the unitary-executive debate generally). 
 70. Cf. Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation 
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countable for the various actions—executive, quasi-legislative, 
and quasi-adjudicative—that it takes. This ensures that it does 
not impact individuals in the manner of a legislature, an execu-
tive, or a court without the accountability protections that ac-
company actions of those branches.  
1.  Legislative and Presidential Accountability in the 
Administrative State 
A danger of the administrative state is that it can be used 
to obscure the nature of the policy decisions made by the legis-
lature, the implementation of those decisions by the executive, 
or the very facts on which such decisions are based. The na-
tional legislature might, for instance, eschew tough, precise pol-
icy choices in favor of very broad delegations to administrative 
actors whose implementation of those choices will be less visi-
ble to the populace and unanswerable at the ballot box. The 
President, for his part, might avoid accountability for adminis-
trative state decision making by leaving to unelected bureau-
crats all decisions not statutorily delegated to him. Or he might 
avoid accountability by acting without transparency. He could, 
for instance, hide the bases for decisions. Or he might secretly 
steer decisions while publicly distancing himself from them.  
That the President might leave decision making to un-
elected bureaucrats is, of course, the core concern of unita-
rians.71 Yet if we assume—as I argue in Accountability and 
Administrative Structure—that disunity does not violate formal 
constitutional limits,72 then the question is a functional one: do 
restrictions on presidential control intolerably frustrate ac-
countability? Unitarians deem the answer a categorical “yes” 
with respect to any restrictions that breach conditions of uni-
ty.73 Yet this answer is correct only if one can not reasonably 
 
of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 579 (1984) (“Each 
agency is subject to control relationships with some or all of the three constitu-
tionally named branches, and those relationships give an assurance—
functionally similar to that provided by the separation-of-powers notion for the 
constitutionally named bodies—that they will not pass out of control.”).  
 71. See, e.g., Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 6, at 102–03. 
 72. See Kitrosser, supra note 12, at 5. 
 73. See Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 6, at 2. Unlike other unitarians, 
Lawrence Lessig and Cass Sunstein stop short of a categorical demand. Ra-
ther, they argue that there ought to be, at minimum, a presumption favoring 
unity. Id. at 103. This is a step in the right direction insofar as it assumes that 
unity is not formally demanded and that there may be some cases in which 
unity undermines accountability. Nonetheless, because the notion that unity 
presumptively enhances accountability is at least reasonably arguable, Con-
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contest the notion that unity inevitably intrudes on—and does 
not undermine—accountability. If the point is reasonably argu-
able, then the question is one of degree: did Congress go too far 
in restricting presidential control and hence accountability? 
From this perspective, the constitutional calculus looks much 
like the loose balancing test that the Supreme Court employed 
in Morrison v. Olson.74 There, the Court upheld the indepen-
dent counsel provisions of the Ethics in Government Act 
against a separation of powers challenge.75 The provisions em-
powered the Attorney General—an officer who serves by sta-
tute at the President’s pleasure—to terminate the counsel only 
for “good cause.”76 Echoing earlier case law, the Court ex-
plained that Congress may not grant itself “a role in the re-
moval of executive officials other than through its established 
powers of impeachment and conviction.”77 Congress may, how-
ever, limit the President’s power to remove officers if the re-
moval restrictions functionally do not “impede the President’s 
ability to perform his constitutional duty . . . .”78  
The Supreme Court’s approach to a separate functional 
concern—that the national legislature will shirk accountability 
through overly broad delegations to the executive branch—
sheds additional light on the unitary executive debate. Through 
the body of caselaw comprising the nondelegation doctrine, the 
Court has come to accept broad policymaking delegations from 
Congress to the administrative state.79 This reflects the Court’s 
recognition of the limits of bright-line, formalist distinctions be-
tween legislating and executing. To say that only Congress may 
legislate is to suggest a sharp constitutional and practical 
boundary between creating law and implementing law that 
does not exist. The Court instead has settled on a loose and de-
ferential standard—Congress need only provide an “intelligible 
principle” to guide administrative policymaking.80 At the same 
 
gress must retain more leeway to depart from unity than the opportunity to 
rebut a presumption favoring it. 
 74. 487 U.S. 654, 686–93 (1988). 
 75. Id. at 693. 
 76. More precisely, the statute permitted termination only for “good 
cause, physical disability, mental incapacity, or any other condition that sub-
stantially impairs the performance of such independent counsel’s duties.” Id. 
at 663 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 596(a)(1) (Supp. V 1982)). 
 77. Id. at 686. 
 78. Id. at 691. 
 79. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989). 
 80. See, e.g., id.  
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time, there are hints in the Court’s two 1935 cases striking 
down laws on nondelegation grounds—the only two Supreme 
Court cases to do so—of a functional concern with the processes 
by which delegated power is exercised.81 In these early cases, 
decided before the regularization of administrative procedure 
through the Administrative Procedure Act82 (APA), the Court 
expressed concern not only with the delegations’ broad subject 
matters, but with the absence of transparency and procedural 
regularity.83 In A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 
the Court objected that the President’s statutory authority to 
approve or reject a code of fair competition was relatively un-
checked.84 In contrast, the Court referred approvingly to other 
statutes delegating rule-making power under regular and 
transparent procedures.85 The Court voiced similar concerns in 
Panama Refining Co. v. Panama Refining Co., objecting among 
other things that executive orders promulgated under the sta-
tute were not required to state their grounds.86 
Notably, the Court in both Schechter Poultry and Panama 
Refining Co. focused on the fact that the respective statutes de-
legated excessive power to the President.87 Each contrasted the 
excessive delegation to the President with procedurally and 
substantively constrained, and hence proper, delegations made 
to administrative agencies.88  
The Court’s nondelegation analysis bears on unitarian ar-
guments in two closely related ways. First, as a general matter, 
the Court recognizes that excessive presidential discretion can 
undermine accountability.89 Second, the Court’s analysis re-
flects the final constitutional accountability concern cited 
 
 81. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 
521–22, 539–40 (1935); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 406, 432–
33 (1935). 
 82. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–569 (2006). 
 83. See Schechter Poultry, 295 U.S. at 521–22, 539–40; Panama Refining 
Co., 293 U.S. at 406, 432–33. 
 84. See Schechter Poultry, 295 U.S. at 521–22, 539. 
 85. See id. at 539–41. 
 86. See Panama Refining Co., 293 U.S. at 431.  
 87. See Schechter Poultry, 295 U.S. at 539–40; Panama Refining Co., 293 
U.S. at 432–33. 
 88. Schechter Poultry, 295 U.S. at 539–40; Panama Refining Co., 293 U.S. 
at 432–33. 
 89. See, e.g., Schechter Poultry, 295 U.S. at 539–40; Panama Refining Co., 
293 U.S. at 432–33 (comparing the President’s “unfettered discretion” with le-
gislatively created administrative agencies that are required to support their 
orders with findings of fact that are sustained by evidence). 
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above—that the President might use the administrative state 
as a means either to hide the bases for decision making or to 
publicly distance himself from final decisions over which he had 
influence.90  
The President, armed in the administrative state with both 
policymaking and policy-implementing powers, might act cor-
ruptly or incompetently. As the Supreme Court correctly recog-
nized in its early nondelegation cases, regular and transparent 
procedures are necessary to protect against such abuses.91 In 
short, some floor of protective procedures is required when 
broad powers are delegated to the President. Morrison v. Olson, 
in turn, correctly directs that the ceiling on Congress’s leeway 
to limit presidential control in the administrative state be de-
termined through functional analysis deferential to Congress’s 
policy choices.92 
2.  Bureaucratic Accountability 
If Congress indeed has discretion, within functional limits, 
to delegate quasi-legislative, executive, and quasi-judicial pow-
ers to unelected administrators, then functional accountability 
constraints apply to these administrators as well. Political-
branch accountability alone is not enough. The administrative 
state, after all, is a powerful set of entities and capacities in its 
own right. It directly impacts people’s lives and liberty in much 
the way that the actions of the named branches do. Where 
Congress thus empowers administrative agencies to implement 
its legislative programs, Congress must ensure not only that 
political-branch accountability remains, but that the adminis-
trative state itself cannot impact people’s lives absent mechan-
isms for its own accountability. 
The accountability demanded of the administrative state, 
or “bureaucratic accountability,” is that sufficient to ensure 
that Congress, the President, and the judiciary can determine, 
and respond, if legislative directives are not faithfully or com-
petently followed. This complements political-branch accounta-
bility, enabling congressional control over its administrative 
creations, and also enabling presidential and judicial control 
 
 90. See, e.g., Panama Refining Co., 293 U.S. at 432 (describing how the 
President must show the “determinations of fact” authorizing his authority to 
give a legislative order). 
 91. See, e.g., Schechter Poultry, 295 U.S. at 538–40; Panama Refining Co., 
293 U.S. at 432. 
 92. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 703–07 (1988). 
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over those aspects of the administrative state delegated to 
them. Congress has substantial leeway, pursuant to its enume-
rated powers and the Necessary and Proper Clause, to struc-
ture bureaucratic accountability mechanisms.93 
Bureaucratic accountability, like political-branch accoun-
tability, demands transparency and procedural regularity. 
Such procedural protections, combined with substantive legis-
lative directives, enable the named branches and the public to 
assess legislation’s implementation. The named branches and 
the public should be able to determine, for instance, if agencies 
are considering the substantive factors outlined by statute, if 
they rely impermissibly on other substantive factors, and if 
they are influenced impermissibly by political pressure. This 
requires access to the facts and research on which actions pur-
portedly rely.  
The concept of bureaucratic accountability demands that 
Congress have leeway to insulate certain decisions from politi-
cal pressure, paradoxically to ensure both bureaucratic and po-
litical accountability. Suppose, for example, that Congress 
passes legislation requiring airplanes to meet certain technical 
benchmarks to ensure flight safety. Were the President free to 
step in and substitute his judgment for that of the bureaucrats 
charged with the decision, or if the President had unfettered 
removal power over those bureaucrats, political considerations 
might trump the required statutory factors. It is also not hard 
to imagine that the President might not be forthcoming about 
those political considerations, but might instead pressure ad-
ministrators behind the scenes to claim the President’s favored 
position as their own or to cherry-pick data to justify that posi-
tion. This scenario could defeat political accountability by 
enabling the President to hide or misrepresent his involvement 
in the decision and by obscuring the implementation and effica-
cy of Congress’s legislation. It could also defeat bureaucratic 
accountability by encouraging bureaucratic obfuscation as to 
the motives or factual bases for decision. While constitutional 
accountability directives may not demand that Congress insu-
late such decision making from direct political pressures, they 
do give Congress leeway to choose such measures in the name 
of accountability.94 
 
 93. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
 94. Notably, Peter Strauss interprets case law regarding presidential re-
moval power to support the view that Congress may restrict such power only 
when it declines to grant such power to itself. Strauss, supra note 70, at 614–
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As with (and complementary to) political accountability, 
then, bureaucratic accountability demands a floor—recognized 
in the early nondelegation cases—of transparency and proce-
dural regularity.95 At the same time, it lends itself to deferen-
tial functionalism—as in Morrison—for assessments as to when 
limits on presidential control exceed a constitutional ceiling.96 
III.  THE ACCOUNTABLE EXECUTIVE VERSUS  
THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE   
While there are important distinctions between presiden-
tial accountability, legislative accountability, and bureaucratic 
accountability, two common directives stem from each. First, a 
floor of procedural regularity and transparency is required 
when Congress delegates substantial policymaking power to 
the President or to others in the executive branch. Second, 
Congress enjoys substantial discretion, subject to functional ba-
lancing, to take accountability-enhancing measures beyond the 
requisite constitutional floor. These measures include degrees 
of insulation from presidential control.  
The core concern of unitarians is the latter—that is, the 
constitutional ceiling on Congress’s ability to insulate policy-
making and other discretionary activity in the executive branch 
from presidential control.97 This Section discusses how congres-
sional failure to insulate activity from presidential control can 
diminish presidential, legislative, and bureaucratic accounta-
bility. It demonstrates that, at the very least, one can reasona-
bly disagree with the notion that unitary presidential control 
bolsters accountability. Indeed, one can reasonably conclude 
that unitary presidential control undermines accountability by 
compromising transparency and procedural regularity. Given 
that there are, at minimum, reasonable bases to disagree with 
 
15. An example is the independent-counsel provision at issue in Morrison, un-
der which the Attorney General was restricted to removal for good cause but 
Congress had no removal power. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 701–03. Strauss 
deems this approach warranted under an antipolitics principle. See Strauss, 
supra note 70, at 614–15. Under this principle, Congress may limit presiden-
tial control of agencies to help ensure agency “free[dom] from political domina-
tion or control.” Id. at 615 (quoting Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 
602, 625 (1935) (internal citation omitted)). Congress may, in short, determine 
that “certain types of decisions are preferably made in the absence of any po-
litical intervention,” whether congressional or presidential. Id. at 623. 
 95. See Schechter Poultry, 295 U.S. at 538–40; Panama Refining Co., 293 
U.S. at 431–33. 
 96. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 703–07. 
 97. See, e.g., Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 6, at 102–03. 
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the unitarian accountability argument, Congress’s discretion to 
curtail unity, assuming that there is no formalist constitutional 
unity directive, is subject only to flexible, functional limita-
tions. 
A.  ACCOUNTABILITY AND POLICYMAKING 
Unitarians deem administrative rule making a core exam-
ple of discretionary executive branch activity that the President 
must control.98 Agencies engage in rule making when they 
promulgate regulatory policies pursuant to their relatively 
broad statutory directives.99 Under the constraints of the APA 
and related requirements, even so-called “informal” rule-
making processes entail protections of transparency and proce-
dural regularity.100 Under the APA, an agency must publish a 
notice of proposed rule making, give interested members of the 
public an opportunity to comment on the proposal in writing, 
and publish a “concise general statement of [the rule’s] basis 
and purpose” with the final rule.101 While the APA does not re-
quire an agency to rely exclusively on a designated legal record, 
it subjects the agency’s informal rulemaking to judicial re-
view.102 Among other things, courts may review rule makings 
for determinations that are “arbitrary, capricious”103 or “in 
excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations.”104 
While still a relatively lenient standard of review, it effectively 
requires agencies to rationally explain decisions and their evi-
dentiary bases.105 It also puts them at risk of having their rules 
invalidated should they give insufficient attention to major ob-
jections made in the public comment process.106 They are at 
similar risk where it is evident that they relied on extra-
statutory factors.107 Some statutes go further and explicitly 
 
 98. See infra note 146. 
 99. Cf. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 
837, 844–45 (1984) (“If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, 
there is an express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific 
provision of the statute by regulation.”). 
 100. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)–(d) (2006). 
 101. Id. § 553(c).  
 102. See id. § 706. 
 103. Id. § 706(2)(A). 
 104. Id. § 706(2)(C). 
 105. See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm 
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). 
 106. See id.  
 107. See id. 
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prohibit agencies from basing rules on information not in the 
public rule-making record.108 
Unitarians believe the President must have full discretion 
to fire rule makers for any reason.109 They also state that he 
has a constitutional prerogative to substitute his preferred 
rules for those made by administrators, or simply to act in ad-
ministrators’ stead in the first place.110 The impact of the latter 
prerogatives on procedural floors established in the APA or 
elsewhere is less clear. On the one hand, many unitarians, in-
cluding Cass Sunstein, have, to their great credit, explained 
that unitary executive theory “is not a general claim about the 
President’s power to act on his own or to contradict the will of 
Congress.”111 As Justice Alito put it at his confirmation hear-
ing, “[t]he question of the unitary executive . . . does not con-
cern the scope of executive powers, it concerns who controls 
whatever power the executive has.”112 One might argue, then, 
that while unitary executive theory demands that the Presi-
dent have prerogative to choose final rules, the President must 
make such decisions within statutory parameters. Under the 
APA, for example, such presidential decisions would be subject 
to judicial review for being “arbitrary” or “capricious” or beyond 
substantive statutory limits.113 On the other hand, one could 
reasonably envisage a unitarian argument against such limita-
tions on the basis that presidential discretion to implement sta-
tutes is full and final and may not be made subject to judicial 
second-guessing or procedural constraints. From this perspec-
tive, the only check on presidential implementation would be 
simple political accountability. This area of uncertainty is one 
 
 108. See Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 401–02 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (ex-
plaining that the Clean Air Act must be based on the record compiled and 
made public by the EPA). 
 109. See Posting of Cass Sunstein to The University of Chicago Law School 
Faculty Blog, What the Unitary Executive Debate Is and Is Not About, http:// 
uchicagolaw.typepad.com/faculty/2007/08/what-the-unitar.html (Aug. 6, 2007, 
17:34). 
 110. Cf. id. (“[A]s a matter of constitutional law, the president has consi-
derable control over policymaking by executive agencies . . . .”). 
 111. Id.; see also Charlie Savage, Reaganites Reconsider, THE NATION, 
Sept. 24, 2007, at 5, 5 (quoting Steven Calabresi); Posting of Johnathan Adler 
to The Volokh Conspiracy, Defining the Unitary Executive, http://volokh.com/ 
archives/archive_2007_08_12-2007_08_18.shtml (Aug. 12, 2007, 19:53). 
 112. Posting of Ilya Somin to The Volokh Conspiracy, Distinguishing the 
Scope of Executive Power From Its Distribution, http://volokh.com/archives/ 
archive_2007_08_12-2007_08_18.shtm#1187118574 (Aug. 14, 2007, 15:09). 
 113. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006). 
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that unitarians and nonunitarians might agree should be clari-
fied.  
For purposes of this Section, it suffices to assume the mild-
er interpretation of unitary executive theory’s application to 
rulemaking. Under this interpretation, the President must 
have final say over rules and unfettered power to dismiss rule-
makers, but all statutory requirements of the rule-making 
process must otherwise be followed. There remains a strong ar-
gument, however, that a unitary executive diminishes transpa-
rency and procedural regularity and hence accountability even 
under these conditions. Indeed, a unitary executive lends itself 
to the worst of both worlds with respect to presidential, con-
gressional, and bureaucratic accountabilities alike. It lends it-
self to a President who can publicly distance himself from un-
popular actions of the administrative state, but who has 
substantial power secretly to influence the same. Furthermore, 
for the same reason that the President can plausibly distance 
himself from administrative actions—the obvious impossibility 
of his personally making and being well-informed about all 
agency decisions—the President often will be genuinely out of 
the loop. Yet his proxies—any number of competing White 
House personnel—will remain well positioned to influence poli-
cy out of the public eye.  
First, a President in a unitary regime remains at least as 
able as a President in a nonunitary setting to distance himself 
from unpopular actions of the administrative state.114 Even if 
the President were frequently to exercise his constitutional 
prerogatives to make final rule-making decisions, the President 
is not likely to do the grunt work of writing proposed rules, 
analyzing public comments, engaging in scientific or other 
technical analysis, or writing final rules. That being the case, 
the President remains well poised to distance himself publicly 
even from his own decisions should they prove unpopular. He 
can argue that the administrators below him failed him with 
flawed advice, flawed data, or the like. He can also distance 
himself from actions taken by administrators without firing 
them by explaining to the public that he maintains respect for 
an administrator but that they disagree on the issues at hand. 
The President can also claim that an administrator herself is 
 
 114. See Shane, supra note 40, at 207 (“[T]o a great extent, even the vest-
ing of ultimate decisional authority in the President will not undo the ubiquit-
ous possibilities that a complex bureaucracy affords to disavow responsibility 
for unpopular choices and to claim the chief credit for successes.”). 
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not at fault for unpopular actions, that those below the admin-
istrator failed her with poor advice or incorrect data. Even 
where the President receives substantial political push-back in 
an unusually high-profile case, he can invoke executive privi-
lege to keep Congress from getting to the bottom of the “who 
did what and when” mystery.115 While high profile uses of ex-
ecutive privilege are not without political cost, they often prove 
quite effective at enabling an administration to wait out a polit-
ical scandal with little long-term cost and little in the way of 
factual revelations for public, congressional, or legal review.116 
Examples abound of situations in which the President le-
gally had final say over a matter but managed to obscure re-
sponsibility and avoid substantial public revelation. Consider 
the recent U.S. Attorney controversy in the Bush administra-
tion.117 Though U.S. Attorneys by statute serve at the Presi-
dent’s pleasure,118 the removal and replacement of several of 
them in the middle of President Bush’s second term caused no 
end of mystery as to who made what decisions and why.119 
White House officials simultaneously insisted that the Presi-
dent had no involvement in the removals and claimed executive 
privilege against testifying, despite the fact that executive pri-
 
 115. See id. (“[F]or those who embrace categorical separationism as a con-
stitutional reading, this problem [of the President’s ability to deny responsibil-
ity] is exacerbated by their faith in executive privilege.”). 
 116. In their paper for this panel, Professor Steven Calabresi and Nicholas 
Terrell indicate their shared concern with the overuse of executive privilege. 
See Calabresi & Terrell, supra note 30, at 1716 n.97. This is an important and 
potentially quite constructive point of agreement. Assuming that we agree on 
this point, however, there remain multiple ways discussed throughout this Ar-
ticle in which White House control over bureaucracy facilitates secrecy. See 
discussion infra Part II.A. Indeed, the very ease with which the President can 
invoke executive privilege—even should his claim fail in the unlikely case that 
it reaches a court—adds to such capacity for secrecy. See discussion infra Part 
II.A. Hence, while curtailing the scope of executive privilege would be a very 
important step and one for which those of us concerned about its abuse should 
strive, it is not sufficient to remove the dangers to transparency and accounta-
bility that inhere in a unitary executive. 
 117. See Michael Abramowitz & Amy Goldstein, Bush Claims Executive 
Privilege on Subpoenas, WASH. POST, June 29, 2007, at A1, A12 (“Democrats 
have charged that the administration’s decision last year to fire nine U.S. at-
torney [sic] was tainted by politics and they have called for Attorney General 
Alberto S. Gonzales to resign . . . .”). 
 118. 28 U.S.C. § 541(a) (2006). 
 119. See Dahila Lithwick, Alberto Gonzales, Zen Master, SLATE, May 10, 
2007, http://www.slate.com/id/2165987. 
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vilege claims pertain to discussions in which the President is 
involved.120 When officials did testify, they revealed little.121  
Second, the President can be out of the loop not only in ap-
pearance but in reality. Empirical research from the Bush I 
and Clinton administrations confirm this intuition. Based on 
interviews with EPA officials from both administrations, Lisa 
Schultz Bressman and Michael P. Vandenberg conclude that 
White House intervention in EPA rule making often comes 
from multiple, even competing, channels within the White 
House infrastructure.122 As Bressman and Vandenberg put it, 
“Presidential control is a ‘they,’ not an ‘it.’”123 
Third, a unitarian system enhances the ability of the Pres-
ident or his proxies to influence agency actions away from the 
public eye.124 This is “the [very] opposite of accountability.”125 It 
is intuitive that a President’s capacity (or that of his proxies) 
for political influence over administrators will be greater where 
the President can terminate their employment for any reason. 
The President or his White House proxies can apply behind-
the-scenes pressure not only as to final rule-making determina-
tions but as to the type of factual “findings” that should un-
derscore such determinations. Knowing that the President has 
the power to step in and substitute his preferred rule for that 
formulated by administrators can have a similarly coercive ef-
fect on administrators, even if the President rarely exercises 
this power. Indeed, that Congress itself makes this common-
sense assumption is supported by research demonstrating a 
greater congressional reluctance to delegate power to executive 
agencies during periods of divided government.126  
 
 120. See, e.g., Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Bush Moves Toward Showdown with 
Congress on Executive Privilege, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2007, at A23; Lithwick, 
supra note 119. 
 121. See, e.g., Lithwick, supra note 119. Another striking example hear-
kens back to the Reagan administration. As with the later U.S. Attorney con-
troversy, much of the Iran-Contra controversy involved Congress’s trying to 
determine who did what when and on what authority, and whether the Presi-
dent knew what was going on. THEODORE DRAPER, A VERY THIN LINE: THE 
IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIRS 275–76 (1991). John Poindexter, National Security Ad-
visor to President Reagan, explained that he limited what he told the Presi-
dent so as to give him “future deniability.” Id. 
 122. See Bressman & Vandenbergh, supra note 4, at 99. 
 123. Id. at 49. 
 124. See Shane, supra note 40, at 173. 
 125. Id.  
 126. See Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not 
Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2311, 2341 (2006). Additionally, there is some em-
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The ability of the President or his proxies not only to influ-
ence administrators, but to do so without public or congression-
al knowledge, is a natural consequence of the presidency’s 
structural capacity for secrecy.127 This capacity has expanded 
substantially over time due to factors that include the vast re-
sources of the administrative state.128 The President’s capacity 
to operate in secret is aided also by the practical availability of 
executive privilege claims, as well as more informal means to 
refuse or to stall in response to information requests. 
Of course, the more successful that secretive influence is, 
the less likely we are to learn of it. Still, there are abundant 
examples of secret influence attempts about which we now 
know enough to understand the phenomenon. Writing in the 
mid-1990s, Peter Shane offered a stark example of White 
House oversight during the first Bush administration that 
combined formal presidential control with evasion of public 
scrutiny. Referring to the President’s Council on Competitive-
ness that operated out of the White House without formal legis-
lative sanction, Shane writes: 
First, it was the conclusion of the most extensive journalistic study of 
the Council that it intervened in “dozens of unpublicized controversies 
over important federal regulations, leaving what vice presidential 
aides call ‘no fingerprints’ on the results of its interventions.” The 
White House’s efforts to avoid public disclosure of its oversight activi-
ty took multiple forms: resisting FOIA disclosure of documents be-
longing to President Reagan’s Task Force on Regulatory Relief on the 
ground that the Task Force (and, by implication, the Council) was not 
a covered “agency”; resisting Congressional access to information 
about the Council beyond published fact sheets and the testimony of 
individuals who did not participate in Council deliberations; keeping 
decisions at staff level to shield them from the greater publicity that 
would likely follow cabinet level involvement. Intriguingly, only one 
Council decision——pressuring EPA on pollution permit modifica-
tions——ever escalated to actual presidential involvement; the usual, 
albeit tacit, rule was to avoid appeals to the President wherever poss-
ible. It would not seem unrealistic that behind this approach lay a de-
sire to buffer the President from criticism for Council policies, espe-
cially given a campaign promise to be the “environmental 
president.”129 
 
pirical evidence to suggest that independent agencies are less likely to be in-
fluenced by the policy preferences of a President than are executive agencies. 
See Anne Joseph O’Connell, Political Cycles of Rulemaking: An Empirical Por-
trait of the Modern Administrative State, 94 VA. L. REV. 889, 942–43 (2008). 
 127. See supra notes 54–56 and accompanying text. 
 128. See Kitrosser, supra note 54, at 887–89.  
 129. Shane, supra note 40, at 172–73. 
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The findings of Schultz and Bressman lend additional sup-
port to the notion that White House control is often secretive. 
They write: 
According to 63% of EPA respondents, only rarely or sometimes were 
changes arising from White House involvement apparent in the 
record. This number actually understates the issue because a full 30% 
indicated that they had no knowledge of the contents of the record. Of 
the respondents who had awareness of the contents of the record, 90% 
stated that the record either rarely or sometimes did not contain evi-
dence of White House involvement; the remaining 10% said it never 
did.130 
The problem is also exemplified by recent efforts by the 
second Bush White House to secretly influence EPA decision 
making. The controversy involves the EPA’s reaction to a 2007 
Supreme Court decision, Massachusetts v. EPA.131 The Court 
rejected the EPA’s position that it lacked statutory power to re-
gulate greenhouse gas emissions from automobiles.132 It also 
deemed the EPA’s reasons for refusing to exercise such power 
inconsistent with statutory authority. The Court ordered the 
EPA either to regulate such emissions or to offer a sound statu-
tory basis for not doing so. Such a basis would entail either a 
determination “‘that greenhouse gases do not contribute to cli-
mate change,’” or “a good explanation why [the EPA] cannot or 
will not find out whether they do.”133 
Revelations by EPA staffers indicate that by December 
2007, EPA administrator Johnson had signed off on a 300-page 
report compiled by the agency responsive to the Supreme 
Court’s directive. The report proposed regulating greenhouse 
gas emissions.134 The White House refused to open the report 
and ordered the e-mail through which the EPA had sent it re-
called.135 The official who e-mailed the report to the White 
House—and who refused the White House’s request to recall it 
and later quit his post out of frustration with White House in-
action on climate change—explained, “‘[i]n early December 
[2007], I sent an e-mail with the formal finding that action 
must be taken to address the risk of climate change’ . . . . ‘The 
 
 130. Bressman & Vandenbergh, supra note 4, at 81. 
 131. 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007). 
 132. Id. at 1460. 
 133. Linda Greenhouse, Justices Say E.P.A. Has Power to Act on Harmful 
Gases, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 2007, at A1. 
 134. See Janet Wilson, EPA Bides Time on Emissions Order, L.A. TIMES, 
Mar. 28, 2008, at A10. 
 135. Juliet Eilperin, White House Tried to Silence EPA Proposal on Car 
Emissions, WASH. POST, June 26, 2008, at A2; see also Barringer, supra note 3.  
 1768 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [93:1741 
 
White House made it clear they did not want to address the 
ramifications of that finding . . . .’”136  
As of fall 2008, the EPA’s December 2007 report had not 
been released, nor had much of the information sought by Con-
gress on the nature and extent of White House interference 
with the EPA’s work. EPA administrator Johnson and the 
White House refused to turn over much of the requested infor-
mation, and the White House claimed executive privilege in re-
sponse to congressional disclosure requests.137 As one observer 
explains, “‘[t]here’s really no downside risk [for the White 
House in claiming executive privilege] because, by the time it 
goes into court, the next administration will be in, and they’ll 
simply waive the privilege.’”138 Despite claiming executive pri-
vilege—which assumes that conversations with the President 
are at issue—the White House has publicly distanced itself 
from the EPA’s actions.139 White House spokesman Tony Fratto 
insisted that [not seeking near-term emissions regulation] “was 
a decision [Johnson] made on his own.”140 Similarly, as to 
charges of White House interference with EPA research and 
analysis, Fratto asserted that “[i]t’s the E.P.A. that determines 
what analysis it wants to make available.”141 
As these examples reflect, a unitary executive may well 
diminish, rather than enhance, accountability in the context of 
rule making. This effect is mainly a function of four factors: (1) 
unitariness increases the ability of the President or his proxies 
to control rule-making outcomes, either by decreeing the out-
comes or by influencing administrators’ decisions; (2) by en-
hancing the President’s formal capacity to influence adminis-
trators, unitariness also increases the ability of the President 
or his proxies to shape the record or other administrative ac-
tions on which a rule making—or the decision to forego one—is 
based; (3) given the structural and historical tools at the Presi-
 
 136. Eilperin, supra note 135 (internal quotations omitted). 
 137. Spencer S. Hsu & Carrie Johnson, White House Refuses to Release 
Documents on Air-Quality Policy, WASH. POST, June 21, 2008, at A4; Erica 
Werner, White House Asserts Executive Privilege in EPA Dispute, USA TODAY, 
June 20, 2008, http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2008-06-20-
1499902489_x.htm?. 
 138. INSIDE WASH. PUBLISHERS, CLEAN AIR REPORT, BUSH PRIVILEGE 
CLAIM ON EPA RULES PROMPTS CONGRESSIONAL TEST (2008), available at 
2008 WLNR 11928457. 
 139. See Barringer, supra note 3; Eilperin, supra note 135. 
 140. Eilperin, supra note 135. 
 141. Barringer, supra note 3. 
 2009] THE ACCOUNTABLE EXECUTIVE 1769 
 
dent’s disposal to keep secrets, he and his proxies are well 
equipped to misrepresent his influence on the administrative 
process; and (4) apart from his capacity to hide specific interac-
tions with the administrative state, the President is well-
positioned to distance himself rhetorically from actions he in-
fluenced. 
B.  ACCOUNTABILITY AND GOVERNMENT RESEARCH 
The link between unitariness, information control, and di-
minished accountability is particularly pronounced in the 
realm of agency research and analysis. Whether pursuant to 
statutory command or political necessity, agency decisions typi-
cally purport to stem from research and analysis. Similarly, 
when the President weighs in on decisions in his capacity as 
“rhetorical President,” or when he clearly makes decisions him-
self, he publicly frames his conclusions as responsive to under-
lying facts.142 Thus, President Bush cited intelligence on wea-
pons of mass destruction to justify invading Iraq in 2003.143  
A risk of unity is that, in controlling the vast resources of a 
unitary administrative state, the President will control not only 
final decisions but the very factual picture against which the 
public, Congress, and the courts can judge those decisions.144 
Political or legal accountability in such a scenario is profoundly 
tainted.  
As with the impact of unity on policymaking, there is some 
uncertainty as to its impact upon government research and 
analysis. Unitarians take the position that all discretionary de-
cision making in the executive branch must be subject to presi-
dential control.145 Policymaking and prosecutorial discretion 
 
 142. See generally JEFFREY K. TULIS, THE RHETORICAL PRESIDENCY (1987) 
(describing the rhetorical President as one who acts for the popular will). 
 143. See, e.g., Paul R. Pillar, Intelligence, Policy, and the War in Iraq, 85 
FOREIGN AFF. 15, 16 (2006).  
 144. A 2002 conversation between an unnamed senior White House advisor 
in the Bush Administration and journalist Ron Suskind is telling in this re-
spect. Suskind reports: 
The aide said that guys like me were “in what we call the reality-
based community,” which he defined as people who “believe that solu-
tions emerge from your judicious study of discernible reality.” I nod-
ded and murmured something about enlightenment principles and 
empiricism. He cut me off. “That’s not the way the world really works 
anymore,” he continued. “We’re an empire now, and when we act, we 
create our own reality.” 
Suskind, supra note 3, at 51. 
 145. See supra notes 19–23 and accompanying text. 
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are among the powers that they deem clearly covered by this 
description.146 It is less clear that the description includes an 
administrator whose entire job involves research and analy-
sis—for example, a government scientist whose only tasks are 
to perform research and to report on its results.147 Arguably, 
unitary executive theory does not demand presidential control 
over such an employee because one who purely conducts and 
reports on research is not making discretionary decisions as to 
how to execute the law. On the other hand, one could argue 
that research inevitably entails determining which research 
projects to pursue and which to discontinue, to place on hold, or 
to eschew from the outset. Such determinations might be 
deemed decisions as to how to execute the legislative directives 
under which the research is performed.  
This ambiguity, too, is one that unitarians and nonunita-
rians alike might agree should be addressed. For purposes of 
this Section, however, it suffices to assume the milder applica-
tion of unitary executive theory. That is, it suffices to assume 
that persons whose jobs consist solely of conducting and report-
ing on research are not within the category of those who must, 
under unitary executive theory, be subject to full presidential 
control. Under this interpretation, however, unitary executive 
theory still facilitates substantial presidential control over in-
formation and thus compromises accountability.  
Assuming that unitary executive theory does not demand 
presidential control over those who solely perform and report 
on research, it does demand such control over those whose jobs 
include both discretionary decision making and conducting, 
analyzing, or reporting on research. Indeed, it is hard to im-
 
 146. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 706 (1988) (Scalia, J., dis-
senting); Shane, supra note 40, at 162 (discussing that under unitary execu-
tive theory, as espoused in the Reagan and first Bush administrations, “the 
President enjoys plenary authority over all policy making involved in the ex-
ecution of the laws”); Christopher S. Yoo et al., The Unitary Executive in the 
Modern Era, 1945–2004, 90 IOWA L. REV. 601, 607 (2005) (referring to the un-
itarian mandate of presidential control over “policy-making” officials and ac-
tivities). 
 147. In Bowsher v. Synar, a decision generally praised by unitarians, the 
Supreme Court appears to suggest that jobs consisting solely of research and 
analysis might not be executive in nature. 478 U.S. 714, 733 (1986) (deeming 
the Comptroller General an executive officer based not on the fact that he 
compiles a report on necessary budget cuts but on the fact that the conclusions 
in his report bind the President); see also Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 6, at 
114 (suggesting that providing information alone might not be an executive 
task); Prakash, supra note 6, at 793 n.530 (same). 
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agine a scenario in which an administrative policy decision 
would not purport to be justified by research and thus entail in-
terpreting and reporting, if not conducting research. Unitary 
executive theory also demands control over anyone whose job 
includes both discretionary decision making and the supervi-
sion of government researchers and analysts. It further de-
mands control over inspectors general and others who are em-
powered to investigate and punish improper interference with 
research or analysis. In all of these respects, unitary executive 
theory impacts the independence of research and analysis.  
The EPA rule-making controversy cited above exemplifies 
the presidential control over research that follows from re-
search’s entwinement with discretionary decision making. As 
noted, the White House succeeded not only in stopping the 
EPA’s planned emissions regulation proposal but in stopping 
the release of a detailed report justifying the same. Most of 
what presently is known about the report stems from disclo-
sures by aggrieved staff members. One press account draws on 
such disclosures to report: 
[A] few senior White House officials were unwilling to allow the EPA 
to state officially that global warming harms human welfare . . . .  
  Career EPA officials argued that the global benefits of reducing 
carbon are worth at least $40 per ton, but Bush appointees changed 
the final document to say the figure is just an example, not an official 
estimate . . . . 
  “The administration didn’t want to show a high-dollar value for 
reducing carbon,” said one EPA official, adding that the administra-
tion cut dozens of pages from a draft that outlined cost-effective ways 
to reduce greenhouse gases. 
. . . . 
  The proposal that the EPA will unveil [in lieu of the now shelved 
proposal of December 2007], known as an advance notice of proposed 
rulemaking, stands in stark contrast to the agency’s original Dec. 5 
finding——backed up by a lengthy scientific analysis——that global 
warming is unequivocal, that there is “compelling and robust” evi-
dence that the emissions endanger public welfare and that the EPA 
administrator is “required by law” to act to protect Americans from 
future harm. . . .148 
Other examples illustrate the connection between presi-
dential control over administrators—either directly through his 
ability to terminate them or to alter their work (such as 
through the review processes of the White House Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB)), or indirectly through his 
 
 148. Juliet Eilperin & R. Jeffrey Smith, EPA Won’t Act on Emissions This 
Year, WASH. POST, July 11, 2008, at A1. 
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ability to terminate or direct their supervisors—and that over 
research and reporting outside of the rule-making context.149 
For example, White House review of congressional testimony 
by executive agency officials is commonplace,150 as are White 
House efforts to distance itself from such review. During the 
Reagan administration, for instance, the OMB altered testimo-
ny that James Hansen—who served at NASA at the time, who 
remains there today, and who is widely considered “the pree-
minent climate scientist of our time,”—was to present to the 
Senate.151 The OMB “change[d] . . . the text, and the main point 
in particular, that the greenhouse effect was changing climate. 
The approved version stated that the cause was unknown.”152 
Less routine than such OMB review was Hansen’s response. 
Angered by the OMB’s action and by similar reviews that he 
had endured in the past, he “disavow[ed] his own written tes-
timony in person before the [Senate] committee,” “clarify[ing] 
the differences between his actual opinions and the text he had 
been forced to submit.”153 Hansen’s response was so unusual 
that it generated intense media interest, forcing the White 
House to distance itself from what had occurred by blaming “a 
nameless OMB bureaucrat ‘five levels down from the top.’”154 
Yet while White House interference in research and its re-
porting cuts across administrations and parties,155 we again see 
particularly stark examples in the most recent Bush adminis-
tration. What is important about these examples is not what 
they tell us about a single administration. Rather, it is what 
they remind us about the ever-present danger to information 
flow in a system of pervasive presidential control of the admin-
istrative state. Such risks are not limited to congressional tes-
timony, but impact all outlets for reporting research, including 
official reports and media appearances. As James Hansen ob-
serves: “[In the Bush administration,] they’re picking and 
 
 149. See, e.g., Croley, supra note 9, at 824–25 (describing OMB review of 
rule making); Peter Strauss, Foreword, Overseer or “The Decider”? The Presi-
dent in Administrative Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 696, 732–33 (2007) (citing 
recent changes to OMB review of rule making). 
 150. Andrew C. Revkin, Cheney’s Office Said to Edit Draft Testimony, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 9, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/09/washington/09enviro 
.html?. 
 151. MARK BOWEN, CENSORING SCIENCE 3, 227 (2008). 
 152. Id. at 227. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. at 228. 
 155. See Revkin, supra note 150. 
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choosing information according to the answer that they want to 
get, and they’ve appointed so many people who are just focused 
on this that they really are having an impact on the day-to-day 
flow of information.”156 
The Bush administration institutionalized control of scien-
tific reporting in part by increasing the use of political appoin-
tees, as opposed to career civil servants, to oversee the final 
vetting of reports from science agencies.157 Indeed, the top 
three public affairs people at the National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration (NASA) were White House appointees 
during a now infamous period in the middle of the Bush admin-
istration.158 In this period climate change reports and press re-
leases routinely were edited—generally by nonscientists, and in 
one case by a twenty-four-year-old political appointee who 
lacked a college degree—to downplay scientists’ conclusions on 
human-made global warming.159 Also in this period, scientists 
for the first time since NASA’s founding in 1958 were required 
to pre-clear media appearances with NASA’s public affairs of-
fice.160 According to journalist Andrew Revkin, White House in-
terference with NASA’s science reporting was particularly “in-
tense in the run-up to the 2004 election.”161 
The aggregate impact of such events on the morale of gov-
ernment scientists was documented in surveys conducted by 
the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) and the Government 
Accountability Project.162 For example, of 1586 scientists res-
ponding to an online survey by UCS in 2007, “60 percent . . . or 
889 scientists, reported personally experiencing what they 
 
 156. Andrew C. Revkin, Bush vs. the Laureates: How Science Became a 
Partisan Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2004, http://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/19/ 
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for the two highest positions in public affairs [at NASA] to be filled by ‘politi-
cals.’”). 
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viewed as political interference in their work over the last five 
years.”163  
  CONCLUSION   
Presidential invocations of unitary executive theory are 
hardly exclusive to one administration or one party. This is un-
surprising, as the human tendency to aggrandize power is well 
understood. Indeed, this view of human nature is among the 
core reasons why the Founders insisted on the accountability 
mechanisms discussed throughout this Article. As James Madi-
son famously said, “[i]f angels were to govern men, neither ex-
ternal nor internal controls on government would be neces-
sary.”164 
Nonetheless, the past eight years have seen such copious 
applications of unitary executive theory that they offer particu-
larly stark lessons in its problems. This Article has focused on 
problems in the theory’s functionalist, accountability-based jus-
tifications. Specifically, unitary executive theory can under-
mine, rather than bolster, government accountability. While 
the Constitution embodies several interlocking types of accoun-
tability, a degree of transparency and procedural regularity 
underscores each type. The centralization of executive power in 
the President enhances the capacity of the President and his 
proxies to make or implement policy behind closed doors. More 
insidiously, it enables them to shape the very “facts” upon 
which policies purport to be based.  
It also is important to recognize that the conclusion that 
unitary executive theory undermines government accountabili-
ty need only be reasonably arguable to undermine the theory. 
This is because unitarians argue that functional accountability 
concerns independently demand unity, apart from any formal-
ist directives.165 Yet if it is reasonably arguable that unity un-
dermines accountability, then the argument from accountabili-
ty simply is not so ironclad as to support a categorical unity 
directive.  
In addition to illustrating unity’s accountability-based 
problems, events in the Bush administration illuminate re-
spects in which unitary executive theory has plainly been mi-
 
 163. Herbert, supra note 162; see also INTERFERENCE AT THE EPA, supra 
note 162, at 2. 
 164. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter 
ed., 1961). 
 165. See supra notes 6, 25–32 and accompanying text. 
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sinterpreted, and others in which its practical applications are 
unclear. Even if unitarians and nonunitarians cannot agree on 
the theory itself, they surely can agree on the benefits of clari-
fying the theory and its practical implications. At least four 
points bear mention in this respect.  
First, it seems clear, as unitarians including Steven Cala-
bresi have observed, that the Bush administration and com-
mentators over the last eight years have failed at points to un-
derstand that the theory involves the allocation of executive 
power, not its content or scope. The theory, in short, dictates 
that the President must control all executive power. It does not 
dictate how much power must belong exclusively to the execu-
tive branch as opposed to Congress or the courts. Thus, for ex-
ample, the President cannot resist complying with laws that 
specify how he may and may not conduct wiretapping on unita-
ry executive grounds. Any such resistance would have to be 
based on some other ground—such as that wiretapping deci-
sions belong exclusively to the executive branch and not to 
Congress. 
The second point is a bit of a caveat to the first. While uni-
tary executive theory is about who controls executive power ra-
ther than its content and scope, there are some points of over-
lap between those two areas. For example, insofar as 
unitarians claim that the President alone must control all ex-
ecutive activity, they necessarily claim that Congress cannot 
constitutionally demand that any final executive decisions be 
made by others, or that the President must have good cause to 
fire an executive official. Similarly, the implications of unitary 
executive theory for imposing APA-like procedural and judicial 
review requirements on the President are not entirely clear. On 
the one hand, one could argue that such requirements are en-
tirely consistent with unitary executive theory as they simply 
define the law that the President must implement. On the oth-
er hand, one might insist that while Congress can give the 
President substantive statutory directives, it may not dictate 
how he executes those directives. Nor can it subject his perfor-
mance to judicial review. Clarification on this point would be 
useful.  
Third, consideration is called for as to whether government 
personnel whose jobs consist entirely of research and analysis 
are discretionary executive employees who constitutionally 
must serve at the President’s pleasure. The intuitive answer 
seems to be no, and the Supreme Court, in a decision generally 
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praised by unitarians, appears to assume that a pure research 
position is not executive in nature.166 Additionally, at least one 
unitarian scholar has indicated that pure research positions 
may not be executive in nature, although he does not reach a 
firm conclusion on that point.167 Given recent experiences with 
political control of research and the importance of research in-
tegrity to accountability, this too is an area in which clarifica-
tion is called for. 
A fourth and final point about the practical implementa-
tion of unitary executive theory is made in a new paper by Sai-
krishna Prakash. Prakash objects to the White House practice 
of imposing OMB oversight on rule makings delegated by sta-
tute to agencies.168 As a unitarian, Prakash argues that the 
President himself must be able to control activities delegated 
by statute to agencies. But to authorize another executive 
branch actor to engage in such control amounts to presidential 
lawmaking.169 This point has significant implications for the 
practice of unitary executive theory. If the President has consti-
tutional leeway only to personally control executive activity, ra-
ther than to delegate the same to others, there are substantial 
practical constraints on the exercise of his unitarian preroga-
tives.  
Overall, then, this Article embraces two conclusions. First, 
it is at minimum reasonably arguable that unity undermines, 
rather than advances, government accountability. Given this 
fact, and given the absence of a formal constitutional unity di-
rective as I discuss in a separate article,170 Congress must have 
flexibility to create zones of relative independence from presi-
dential control in the administrative state. Second, to the ex-
tent that unitary executive theory continues to have political or 
legal influence, it is important that the theory’s reach be de-
bated and clarified. At best, such clarification may protect ac-
countability by limiting the reach of presidential control. Such 
limiting effect could follow, for example, from the conclusion 
that the theory does not demand presidential immunity from 
statutory procedural requirements or presidential discretion to 
 
 166. See Bowsher v. Synar, 487 U.S. 714, 733 (1986). 
 167. See Prakash, supra note 6 at 1014–15. Lessig & Sunstein seem more 
definitively to embrace this conclusion. Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 6, at 
114. 
 168. Saikrishna B. Prakash, Fragmented Features of the Constitution’s Un-
itary Executive, 45 WILLAMETTE L. REV. (forthcoming Apr. 2009). 
 169. Id. 
 170. See generally Kitrosser, supra note 12. 
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dismiss employees whose jobs consist solely of research. Even if 
the consensus were that the theory is best interpreted broadly 
in such areas of ambiguity, this would at least clarify the 
grounds of the debate. Such clarification would make all the 
more evident the negative impact of unitary executive theory 
on government accountability.  
